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AS EARLY as January 1999, a World Health Organization
committee warned that smallpox now poses “the most serious bioterrorist
threat to the civilian population.” But the recent cases of anthrax exposure,
including one death, have made the chances of an attack more worrisome. While
the United States has antibiotics to treat anthrax, a potentially lethal
bacteria, the smallpox virus is much harder to treat—its fatality rate is
nearly 1 in 3 cases. That makes vaccination the most effective weapon against
the disease. Secretary of Health and Human Services Tommy Thompson has
promised that enough doses will be ready to vaccinate every American by
“sometime next year.” Will that be soon enough?
Jonathan Tucker, director of the Chemical &
Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Program at California’s Monterey
Institute for International Studies, and author of the book “Scourge: The
Once and Future Threat of Smallpox,” spoke with NEWSWEEK’s Jennifer Barrett
about the threat of smallpox and the possibility of reinstating nationwide
vaccinations against the virus. Tucker recently fractured his jaw, but was
able to conduct the interview with NEWSWEEK via e-mail.
NEWSWEEK: On Wednesday, Secretary of Health and
Human Services Tommy Thompson announced that he had asked lawmakers for $509
million to contract four pharmaceutical companies to produce as much as 300
million doses by the end of 2002, enough to protect every American from
smallpox. Is that a realistic monetary figure and timeline? What’s involved
in building up the vaccine supply?
Jonathan B. Tucker: Secretary Thompson’s
proposal to acquire 300 million doses of smallpox vaccine by the end of next
year is an enormously ambitious proposal. The old smallpox vaccine was
produced by inoculating the vaccine virus (vaccinia) into the scarified skin
of living calves and harvesting the virus-rich pus. This method resulted in a
vaccine that, while effective, was often contaminated with bacteria and other
viruses. As a result, the old production method no longer meets the quality-control
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standards of the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA). Instead, the vaccine virus will be grown in living
animal cells suspended in a nutrient medium in a stainless-steel tank known
as a bioreactor. Developing the new production process, scaling it up, and
ensuring that the new vaccine is safe and effective, will all take time. Even
if all 300 million doses can be produced by the end of 2002, a task that will
pose major technical challenges, the new vaccine will not have been approved
by the FDA. Thus, it could only be administered in an emergency situation as
an Investigational New Drug, requiring informed consent. Finally, whether or
not Congress is prepared to appropriate more than $500 million to acquire
smallpox vaccine remains to be seen.
What prompted you to write “Scourge”?
As a specialist on biological weapons, I found
the story of smallpox particularly dramatic and compelling, reflecting both
the positive and negative sides of human nature. For thousands of years,
smallpox killed hundreds of millions of people and repeatedly changed the course
of world history. It was also the first—and thus far, only—infectious disease
to be eradicated by means of a global vaccination campaign that was
coordinated by the World Health Organization during the late 1960s and early
1970s. Yet at the same time Soviet epidemiologists were participating in this
noble effort, the Soviet military was secretly turning the smallpox
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“Smallpox
virus (scientific name variola major) would be a “good” biological warfare
agent because it is unusually robust, can be disseminated through the air as
an inhalable aerosol to infect people over a large area, and—unlike
anthrax—is contagious from one person to another. ”
— JONATHAN TUCKER
director, Chemical &
Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Program
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Smallpox virus (scientific name
variola major) would be a “good” biological warfare agent because it is
unusually robust, can be disseminated through the air as an inhalable aerosol
to infect people over a large area, and—unlike anthrax—is contagious from one
person to another. Even if a relatively small group of people were infected
in an initial attack, they could spread the disease widely. As a result,
release of the virus could trigger an expanding epidemic unless transmission
was halted by means of an aggressive vaccination campaign. The drawback of
smallpox as a biological weapon is that it could not be “targeted”—unless
contained, the disease would continue to spread and might eventually
boomerang against the attacking country.
You say the deliberate use of smallpox as a
military/terrorist weapon is the most likely source of recurrence. Why?
Because the smallpox virus only infected
people and did not have a wild-animal host, it was possible to eradicate the
disease by using vaccination to interrupt the chains of human-to-human
transmission. A number of scenarios have been suggested for a possible
resurgence of smallpox. First, there is a finite risk that the smallpox virus
could escape from the two maximum-containment laboratories in the United
States and Russia where internationally sanctioned research with the virus is
taking place. Second, it is possible that global warming could cause the
frozen corpses of smallpox victims in the Arctic who were buried in the permafrost
to rise to the surface and infect someone who came into contact with them.
Third, a related virus called monkeypox, which causes sporadic outbreaks of
human disease in jungle regions of central and western Africa, might mutate
to become more virulent and contagious in humans. Most experts downplay these
risks, however, and contend that the most likely source of a recurrence of
smallpox would be the deliberate release of the virus as a military or
terrorist weapon.
How hard would it be for someone to obtain and
to release the smallpox virus?
Acquiring, producing, and delivering the
smallpox virus would pose a series of challenging technical hurdles for
terrorists, making an attack with the virus unlikely—although potentially catastrophic
were it to occur. First, because the smallpox virus no longer exists in
nature, terrorists would have to acquire it from a state with undeclared
laboratory stocks of the virus, or perhaps from former Soviet bioweapons
scientists who had smuggled out samples of the virus. Second, the terrorists
would have to grow the virus in eggs or animal cells, which is technically
challenging. Third, they would have to find some means of disseminating the
virus as a fine, inhalable mist of microscopic particles or droplets (called
an aerosol), which would require specialized technology and know-how. For a
low-tech attack, suicide terrorists might consider infecting themselves and
spreading the disease, but they would have only a few days to do so before
the facial rash became obvious. Moreover, even terrorists prepared for
instant martyrdom in an explosion might hesitate before willingly suffering a
slow, painful, and hideous death from a disease like smallpox.
Where might one find smallpox virus stocks?
Only two laboratories in the world have been
authorized by the World Health Organization (WHO) to retain samples of the
smallpox virus. The first is at the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) in Atlanta, and the second at a Russian laboratory known as
“Vector,” in the town of Koltsovo near Novosibirsk. These two repositories
are currently conducting research with live smallpox virus under close
oversight by the WHO, with the aim of characterizing multiple strains of the
virus, screening a wide variety of antiviral drugs for possible efficacy in
treating smallpox, and developing an animal model of the disease. It is
rumored, however, that undeclared stocks of smallpox virus may exist in a
number of countries, including Russia, North Korea, and Iraq. The evidence in
the public domain is circumstantial, such as the fact that Iraq and North
Korea continue to vaccinate troops against smallpox. Iraqi officials also
admitted to U.N. weapons inspectors that they had conducted military research
on a closely related virus called camelpox, which could have been used as a
“surrogate” to develop production and dissemination techniques for smallpox
virus.
If someone gained access to the stocks, how
much would he or she need to create a major outbreak?
Because smallpox is contagious, even a
relatively small release that infected a few dozen individuals could spread
considerably by the time the first cases were diagnosed. Since smallpox has a
two-week incubation period before the first symptoms appear, the exposed
individuals might disperse widely. The worst-case scenario would involve a
release of smallpox in an airport, so that infected people would travel to
cities around the country and trigger multiple outbreaks.
What makes smallpox so dangerous? How does it
compare to anthrax and other forms of bioterrorism?
Smallpox, which has a mortality rate of about
30 percent, is less lethal than inhalational anthrax, which kills roughly 90
percent of its victims [if untreated]. But whereas anthrax is not contagious
and is treatable with antibiotics at an early stage, smallpox spreads readily
from person to person, and no drug treatment is available. Thus, anthrax
would only affect those individuals who were directly exposed to the
bacteria, but a release of smallpox could trigger a major epidemic that, if
not aggressively contained by vaccination, could spread uncontrollably.
How can we protect ourselves from a smallpox
outbreak?
Given the lack of a drug therapy for smallpox, the
best approach for reducing our vulnerability to smallpox is to expand the
available supply of the vaccine. Most Americans alive today are susceptible
to smallpox infection, either because they were never vaccinated or because
their immunity has worn off. Since a single vaccination provided protection
for only about 10 years, people who were vaccinated once in childhood have
little residual immunity. Those who received at least one “booster,” or
revaccination, probably have a greater level of immunity today, but not
necessarily enough to protect them fully.
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Thus, in the event of a
smallpox outbreak, it would be necessary to vaccinate all those at immediate
risk of exposure. At present, the United States retains somewhere between 7.5
million and 15 million doses of smallpox vaccine, far from enough to manage
even a medium-size epidemic. Responding to this situation, the U.S.
government is moving to expand the national supply of the smallpox vaccine by
taking a two-pronged approach. First, as a stop-gap measure, the National
Institutes of Health have commissioned studies of the feasibility of diluting
the existing vaccine 5- or even 10-fold, which could expand the available
supply to some 75 million doses. Second, the government is accelerating the
acquisition of a large additional supply of vaccine.
In your opinion, why hasn’t our government
taken the threat more seriously before now?
Before the recent anthrax attacks,
bioterrorism was largely seen as a theoretical threat. Only one major
incident in the United States had been previously reported: a scheme by the
Oregon-based Rajneeshee cult in 1984 to affect the outcome of a local
election by contaminating local restaurant salad bars with salmonella
(food-poisoning) bacteria. That incident made more than 750 people sick, but
did not result in any deaths. Although the Clinton administration began to
take concrete measures to address the threat of bioterrorism, these programs
were poorly coordinated, and Congress declined to fund a number of proposed
initiatives. Since Sept. 11, the once hypothetical threat has become a
reality, resulting in a dramatic change of attitude on the part of
policymakers, the Congress and the public.
Why did we not reinstate nationwide (or
worldwide) vaccinations earlier, particularly if the government was aware of
the danger of an intentional smallpox outbreak?
Vaccination of American children against
smallpox was mandatory before school entry until 1972, when the U.S.
government determined that the risk that cases of the disease would be
imported into the country—the last U.S. case was in 1949—was lower than the
risk of serious complications associated with the vaccine. (The smallpox
vaccine is based on a live virus called vaccinia, which is closely related to
the smallpox virus and protects against it, but normally does not cause
disease itself.)
In people with eczema or an impaired immune
system, however, the vaccine virus can proliferate out of control, causing
serious complications such as encephalitis or even death. Rare complications
were also reported in otherwise healthy people, and it was impossible to
predict in advance who would be stricken. When Americans were routinely
vaccinated against smallpox, roughly one in every million recipients suffered
death or permanent brain damage. The risk of complications would probably be
significantly higher today because of the greater incidence of
immunosuppression associated with HIV/AIDS infection, cancer chemotherapy,
and organ transplantation.
Given this situation, it would make sense to
begin vaccinating the general population against smallpox only if the risk of
terrorist use of the disease was assessed to be higher than the risk of
complications from the vaccine. That is not currently the case. One advantage
of the smallpox vaccine is that it works extremely rapidly and can either
prevent or reduce the severity of the disease even if administered up to five
days after infection. Thus, in the event one or more cases of smallpox were
diagnosed, the vaccine could be administered in a targeted manner to all
those who had come in contact with the first wave of cases, thereby
containing the outbreak and preventing further spread.
What measures should the government take to
protect us from other bioterrorist threats? What would that require in terms
of money, manpower and time?
In addition to stockpiling antibiotics and
vaccines, the best approach to reducing the nation’s vulnerability to
bioterrorism is to fill a number of serious gaps in our public-health system.
These gaps include: (1) training primary-care providers to recognize unusual
infections such as anthrax and smallpox, which they would normally never
encounter in their medical practice, and telling them where to report
suspicious cases of infectious disease; (2) increasing the staffing and
resources of city, county and state public-health departments, so that they
can respond to doctors’ reports on a 24/7 basis; (3) increasing the number of
diagnostic laboratories with the ability to diagnose bioterrorist threat
agents, and (4) helping hospitals to develop contingency plans for handling
the massive influx of patients that might result from a bioterrorist attack,
particularly with a contagious agent.
Local, state and federal public-health agencies
will also need to be networked together with computers and Internet links so
that the system functions as an integrated whole, and resources (such as
vaccines, drugs, manpower and expertise) can be brought to bear promptly
where they are needed. The advantage of strengthening the U.S. public-health
system is that such measures are “dual-use.” Even if a major bioterrorist
attack never materializes, we will be better prepared to respond to a serious
outbreak of a natural-emerging infection, such as the recent outbreak of West
Nile virus in New York City. In the worst-case scenario, we might have to
deal with a serious natural epidemic akin to Spanish influenza, which killed
more than 20 million people worldwide in 1918-19.
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