6 November 2002 19:00 GMT

by Bea Perks

The Royal Society has today submitted a proposal to the British Government in support of an international code of conduct governing research vulnerable to bioterrorist exploitation. The aims are laudable, says leading US microbiologist John Collier, but achieving them presents a serious challenge.

The proposal was submitted to the government's Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in preparation for a forthcoming meeting of signatories to the 1972 Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BTWC) in Geneva next week. The FCO will represent Britain's interests at the meeting. (A parallel document is expected in the US within a few months.)

In a six-page document, members of the Royal Society's standing committee on the Scientific Aspects of International Security discuss the growing threat of biological warfare facing the international community.

The committee concludes by supporting the creation of an International Advisory Panel together with a universally agreed set of standards on which to base a much longer-term project - the creation of an international code of conduct. "Serious consideration needs to be given as to how to ensure that such a code will be effective," warn committee members. "This includes questions such as how the code and good practice procedures will be enforced, who will be responsible for checking a researcher's work, [and] what penalties would occur if a researcher contravened the code."

The creation of such a code would require very serious consideration indeed, says Collier, professor of microbiology and molecular genetics in the department of microbiology and molecular genetics at Harvard Medical School. Collier is on the National Academies of Science (NAS) committee on Research Standards and Practices to Prevent Destructive Application of Advanced Biotechnology - the US equivalent of the Royal Society committee. His research involves work on diphtheria and Pseudomonas toxins.

"The trickiest questions revolve around restriction of publication," said Collier. Currently, data submitted for publication is not subject to restrictions based on potential misuse, but this is clearly a situation that needs changing, he says. Realistically, only a "minute fraction" of data would ever be open to abuse, he said, but at the other extreme, "almost any information could be abused." Identifying real threats will be a complex task, with each case having to be dealt with individually by experts specific to particular fields, he says.

Collier's greatest fear is that, by restricting publication, legitimate research into potentially threatening agents will also be threatened. In ten years time, he suggests, research could be at the same stage it is now. Nevertheless, he welcomes the move by the Royal Society, adding that his NAS committee will shortly be publishing a related document, probably at the beginning of next year.

British microbiologist David Evans, reader in virology at the University of Glasgow, also welcomes the Royal Society proposal, but adds the caveat that any increase in monitoring for potential bioweapon risks must not be accompanied by mountains of extra paperwork. If it were, he says, researchers would surely be tempted to take short-cuts. Ideally, he suggests, additional regulation could perhaps be woven into existing paperwork. Researchers already have to complete a health-and-safety section on grant proposals, he points out; perhaps a potential-for-misuse section could be added to these forms.

Microbiologists are generally aware of the potential for misuse of their research, says Evans, and this is something that has not changed since September 11, 2001. He acknowledges that his own research, on picornnaviruses, could be subverted. But the question of making official note of such potential has not been raised before, and would be a welcome advance.

"Formally, we don't have to," said Evans. "Formally, I think it would be a good idea if we did."

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