ON ERODING THE VALUES OF SCIENCE
THE
INSTITUTE OF MEDICINES REPORT ON THE ANTHRAX VACCINE
Meryl
Nass, MD
Nearly two years ago, Congress asked the National Academy of Sciences
(NAS) to review the existing data on safety and efficacy of the anthrax
vaccine (AVA). A committee was created by the NAS Institute of Medicine
(IOM) to do this, and the group met over the last seventeen months to
review this complex and controversial issue.
I attended several of the open meetings, made an invited presentation,
and supplied nearly 300 pages of supporting information to the
committee.
The National Academy of Science's report The Anthrax Vaccine: Is it
safe? Does it work? was released March 6. It claimed to be a thorough
compilation of all the existing data, weighted by reliability, and
included a number of recommendations and ideas for further research.
What did the report conclude? Here is where it gets interesting.
The
report's conclusions rely on ignoring many pieces of crucial
information, and its recommendations give the Department of Defense
everything it could have wanted. The report appears to be "spun" to
support a number of DOD initiatives, and it provides the needed
justification for restarting mandatory anthrax vaccinations over the
objections of many in Congress.
Strong words. Can I back them up? Let's review the Executive Summary
and see what the report concludes about efficacy, safety and vaccine
manufacturing concerns (which closed the plant for four years, until it
finally received FDA approval in January 2002). Several unexpected
recommendations are also explored. Ive excerpted from the text in bold,
and used quotations.
EFFICACY
1. "Because the vaccine exerts its protection via an antigen crucial
to the action of the bacteria's toxins, AVA should be effective against
anthrax toxicity from all known strains of B. anthracis, as well as from
any potential bioengineered strains."
This particular fairly tale has been oft-repeated by a variety of DOD
spokespersons over the last four years, in support of the anthrax
vaccine immunization program. Although it makes logical sense, the
statement is contradicted by the data, in which thousands of vaccinated
animals have succumbed to challenge with many strains of anthrax,
despite generating high levels of antibody to the vaccine antigen in
question, protective antigen or PA.
It
furthermore ignores the work of Pomerantsev et al in Russia (published
in the December 1997 issue of the journal Vaccine), in which a
genetically engineered strain of anthrax had the PA antigen gene
removed. Another gene for cereolysin was inserted, making the
engineered anthrax resistant to a PA-based vaccine like the current
anthrax vaccine.
How did
the IOM report deal with this information? It claimed Pomerantsevs
study was flawed because anti-PA antibody titres of vaccinated animals
were not given. This is a specious argument, because antibody titres in
mice and guinea pigs have shown no correlation with survival. Then the
report complains that hamsters were used, and "little is known about
hamsters as an animal model." The study was done in Russia, and the
Russians who use hamsters as their model probably know plenty about
hamsters and anthrax.
Pomerantsev works at NIH now, not far from IOM. If answers to these
questions were really wanted, Pomerantsev could have been invited to
come answer them.
The
report also mentioned, but immediately ignored, the fact that DOD was so
frightened about this type of engineered anthrax, that it contracted
with Battelle Memorial Institute to genetically engineer a similar
strain. (See Miller J and Broad W. NYT September 4, 2001, page A1.) And
who knows what Pomerantsev is concocting now at NIH?
Claims by IOM that a vaccine "should be effective" against all known
strains and all potential bioengineered strains should be summarily
dismissed as reckless optimism.
2. "The macaque and the rabbit are adequate animal models for
evaluation of the efficacy of AVA for the prevention of inhalation
anthrax."
Many animal models have been used in anthrax experiments. DOD has found
that only the rabbit and rhesus macaque show strong immunity after
anthrax vaccine. The macaque, not surprisingly, has an illness that is
closest pathologically to the human version of inhalation anthrax. The
chimpanzee, however, which is normally considered closer to the human
than the macaque, develops an anthrax illness that more closely
resembles that in guinea pigs and mice.
DOD has long claimed, without citing any data to support the claim, that
because macaque anthrax looks like human anthrax, that the macaque is
the best animal model for studying vaccine immunity. But just because
the disease may be similar pathologically does not mean the macaque
immune response to vaccine is similar to the human response. The IOM
report entirely fails to explain this conceptual leap.
Another leap follows. The rabbit happens to develop stronger immunity
after anthrax vaccination than the rat, mouse or guinea pig. Macaques
are expensive, but rabbits are cheap. So DOD wants to conduct its
vaccine efficacy studies in rabbits, not macaques or chimps. Rabbit
anthrax does not resemble human anthrax closely.
IOM supplied DOD with the desired gold nugget to support rabbit
experiments, based on the misleading argument that macaque anthrax looks
like human anthrax, and the rabbit immune response to AVA looks like the
macaque immune response, therefore rabbits are like humans!
We know
rabbits get good immunity from anthrax vaccine, but the real question is
do humans get good immunity? Where is the evidence that rabbits provide
a good model for human immunity?
The reports assertion that these animals are good models for humans
falls apart several paragraphs later. The IOM report says, "The data
from animal studies already developed suggest that serological
correlates of human immunity can be developed in appropriate
animal models. The committee commends this work and encourages its
further development."
What that means is that at present, there is no way to compare the
immunity developed by animals after vaccination, to the immune response
of humans after vaccination. Bottom line: the IOM gave DOD its
imprimatur to use rabbits, with no supporting evidence or logic, because
they are inexpensive and likely to provide the forgone conclusion
desired.
3. "The committee finds that the available evidence from studies
with humans and animals coupled with reasonable assumptions of
analogy, shows that AVA as licensed is an effective vaccine for the
protection of humans against anthrax, including inhalational anthrax,
caused by any known or plausible engineered strains of B. anthracis."
Here the report makes several claims favorable to DOD, but unsupported
by evidence, in a single sentence:
a) AVA is effective in humans, even for inhalation
b) The addition of the phrase "as licensed" appears to be an attempt to
weigh in on the current case in Federal Court, which notes that the AVA
license does not include an indication (an approved use) for inhalation,
or biological warfare use. If a jury agrees, DOD will be prevented from
forcing anthrax vaccine on troops.
c) The vaccine will be effective for genetically engineered strains.
Despite all the reports hand-wringing about PA, the main vaccine
ingredient, there is clearly no way to know if the vaccine will be
effective against engineered anthrax strains: it depends how they are
engineered.
Ken
Alibeks book "Biohazard" says that vaccine resistant anthrax strains
are possible and were under development in the former USSR. Alibek was
one of this reports reviewers. Were his concerns omitted too, or did he
forget what he wrote 3 years ago?
A legal problem for the vaccine manufacturer, but ignored by FDA in its
rush to license a vaccine to protect us from DOD-developed weaponized
anthrax, released by God Only Knows Whom, and God Only Knows Why (the
federal government hasnt a clue who grabbed its anthrax), is that there
exist no human data to support efficacy of this vaccine for any form of
anthrax in humans: not for cutaneous anthrax, not for inhalation. And
under the regulations in place in 1970 when the vaccine was licensed,
and still in place today, you had to have that data to obtain a license.
Is there reasonable evidence of efficacy? Not really. The vaccine
works in some animals, but not in others. An older, never-licensed
anthrax vaccine had partial efficacy. Maybe this one does too, but the
data to show this in humans do not exist.
SAFETY
4. "Local events, especially redness, swelling, or nodules at the
injection site...are similar to the events observed following receipt of
other vaccines..."
True, but they happen at a much higher rate than with other vaccines.
Why wasn't this mentioned in the Summary?
5. "Systemic events, such as fever, malaise and myalgia, are similar
to the events observed following receipt of other vaccines currently in
use by adults, but are much less common than local events."
Several studies gave 70-80% rates of local reactions, and 48% rates of
systemic reactions for anthrax vaccines. Is 48% much less common than
70%? Both these rates are higher than for other vaccines.
6. "There are sex differences in local reactions following
vaccination with AVA..."
Here the report parrots a misstatement of the facts first made by DOD.
The available data show that females have higher rates of both local
and systemic reactions than males, by a factor of 2-3.
Local reactions are considered minor, and invariably resolve. But
systemic reactions that occur after vaccination may be harbingers of
chronic illnesses to come. Therefore, DOD is unwilling to acknowledge
what its own data show about systemic reactions, and in particular to
admit the existence of a rate disparity between the sexes. Acknowledging
the gender difference in systemic reactions could result in women being
exempted from vaccination, something DOD very much wants to avoid.
(Another case based on gender differences is also winding its way
through the courts.)
7. "The available data are limited but show no convincing evidence
at this time that personnel who have received AVA have elevated risks of
later-onset health events."
Every reference cited to support this statement was to a DOD briefer,
with the exception of three citations to a series of papers looking at
Fort Detrick personnel who each received many different vaccinations.
The problem with these three papers (dated 1958, 1965 and 1974) is that
the research was done on all of them prior to 1971. The anthrax vaccine
was licensed in 1970; therefore, the anthrax vaccine received almost
exclusively by these Detrick personnel was a different anthrax vaccine.
The
problem with using only DOD briefers should be obvious.
What did the report scrupulously avoid in order to draw the above
conclusion?
a) Preliminary data from the Navy were provided to the IOM shortly
before the report was completed. A Navy study had found higher rates of
birth defects in the offspring of vaccinated, as opposed to
non-vaccinated sailors. The IOM report emphasized the preliminary nature
of these data and other limitations in the Navy database, and did not
mention the study in its recommendations.
b) Five studies of Gulf War syndrome found a statistically significant
association between anthrax vaccine, or multiple vaccines given for the
Gulf deployment, and the development of Gulf War Syndrome. No studies
exist that refute this association. These studies were done by five
separate groups of researchers.
This is a major omission, especially since three of the five groups
studied veterans who had received AVA, the identical vaccine being
studied; the other two studies were of British veterans who received a
different anthrax vaccine. The results were similar, however. How did
the IOM report justify this oversight?
First, it
claims that the Gulf War studies "were not designed to study the effects
of vaccine exposure." That is nonsense. Then the report criticizes the
fact that multiple vaccinations were given. But some of the studies did
look at the multiple vaccination issue, and got positive results. This
tells you that at least one of the vaccines is likely causing problems,
or that multiple vaccinations interacted to cause illness. Finally, the
report criticizes the need to rely on self-reports of vaccine exposure.
But since DOD did not put the vaccinations into US soldiers shot
records, all that researchers can do is use self-reports. That is,
unless DOD decides to find the Gulf War vaccination records it
conveniently lost ten years ago.
These
pretexts do not justify junking this research, which has been published
in top medical journals: The Lancet, American Journal of Epidemiology,
and Occupational and Environmental Medicine.
Instead,
the report says that unpublished DOD studies, in most cases done by
young military scientists with little experience in epidemiology, and
which were neither peer-reviewed nor published, were the "best
available" sources of data on AVA and health outcomes.
The available data would not have been limited had IOM chosen to
consider the Gulf War studies, done by seasoned and respected
professionals.
I gave
each committee member a published anthrax vaccine study done at a
military base in England in 2000. Of 100 soldiers who volunteered to
take anthrax vaccine, 71% dropped out of the vaccine series before their
fourth dose. The author was not sure why so many who accepted the
initial dose refused later doses, but the initial adverse reaction rate
was extremely high, and prevented 28% of recipients from lifting or
driving for at least 48 hours following vaccination. This paper also got
no mention in the report.
c) IOM refused to draw any conclusions from the VAERS data (VAERS is a
voluntary adverse event reporting system overseen by FDA and CDC) or
from the Anthrax Vaccine Expert Committee (AVEC), which was formed by
DHHS at DODs request, to review every VAERS report on anthrax vaccine.
IOM pointed out that the VAERS data should be used to generate
hypotheses about vaccine effects, which should then be tested using
methods that have
statistical validity, which VAERS lacks.
However, VAERS has to be studied in order to generate hypotheses: that
is its purpose. FDA did this and put the information in the current
anthrax vaccine's package insert. IOM prefers to imply that no chronic
symptoms reported to VAERS are due to the vaccine, whereas FDA properly
noted that some symptoms are reported with sufficient frequency after
vaccination to be included in the vaccine's label.
Refusing
to consider the VAERS data is another example of how the IOM report
overlooks evidence that might lead in the wrong direction.
New
Manufacturing Process
8. "AVA will now be produced by a newly validated manufacturing
process under strict controls, according to current FDA requirements.
As a result, the post-renovation product has greater assurance of
consistency than that produced at the time of original licensure."
If lack of consistency had been shown to be the reason AVA has not
demonstrated safety or effectiveness, this would be good news. Since
that is not the case, we remain in the dark about the newly licensed
vaccine's safety and efficacy, and how it compares to the previously
licensed vaccine.
Previously manufactured lots of AVA vary in the concentration of their
components by a factor of 40 from lot to lot: some lots have 40 times as
much active ingredient (PA) as others.
Last year, GAO informed Congress of filter changes at the vaccine
manufacturer which led to a 100 fold increase (10,000 per cent increase)
in the level of PA in anthrax vaccine. The series of filter changes
began in 1990, but were not submitted to FDA for required approval. FDA
only learned of these changes from GAO in 2000, and retroactively
approved them several months later.
Somehow,
the IOM report fails to mention the marked recent increase in vaccine
potency, which might be an explanation for the higher reaction rates
reported after 1990. Some newer lots may have 4,000 (40 x 100) times the
potency of earlier lots.
This is a
curious omission, since the current supply of vaccine is extremely
limited. Anthrax vaccine might be effective at 1/100th the
dose, or perhaps be effective at even larger dilutions. The US is
planning to dilute its existing inventory of 15 million doses of
smallpox vaccine to 1/5th its current strength: why not
anthrax?
It would
also be useful to learn whether the increases in PA and other vaccine
components, which could now be 4,000 times greater than in lots of
anthrax vaccine manufactured during the
1980s, affect vaccine safety and efficacy.
The IOM
report fails to suggest any investigation of whether the anthrax vaccine
potency changes have affected safety, efficacy or the optimal dose,
although there is a glaring need for research in these areas.
Surprising Gifts to DOD Found in the Report
9.
"DOD should continue to support the efforts of CDC to study the
reactogenicity and immunogenicity of an alternative route of AVA
administration and of a reduced number of vaccine doses."
This is another nugget IOM threw to DOD, which wants a vaccine license
amendment to permit deeper, intramuscular injections that will hide some
of the local reactions.
10. "The committee finds no scientific reason for the continued
operation of AVEC in its present form. The IOM committee's observations
about AVEC reflect no fault with the members of AVEC or its performance
as that committee is constituted; rather, the IOM committee observes
that AVEC was designed to pay extra attention to safety concerns
regarding the safety of AVA and that the data do not warrant the
continuation of such exceptional attention...
"DOD should disband AVEC in its current form and instead assist FDA and
CDC in establishing an independent advisory committee charged with
overseeing the entire process of evaluating vaccine safety."
a) This recommendation was a big surprise. Commenting on the continued
existence of AVEC is way beyond what the IOM committee was charged to
do. Why did IOM overstep its guidelines to come up with this slap at
AVEC? Is it possible that AVEC began identifying problems with the
vaccine?
AVEC gave
a CDC group investigating anthrax vaccine a list of adverse reactions to
look for in subjects receiving anthrax vaccine. Could its
acknowledgement of adverse vaccine reactions have earned AVEC the coup
de grace?
b) Why did IOM ask DOD to assist FDA and CDC in the evaluation of
vaccine safety? This recommendation has its origins in the twilight
zone. Nothing in the committee charter could possibly be construed as
inviting a recommendation like this one. Does the public want the
Defense Department entering the civilian vaccine arena?
DOD's interest in vaccine safety has been demonstrated by the
following:
- giving
experimental vaccines to military service members without informed
consent or with inadequate information
-
storing vaccines for decades before use, and redating expired vaccines
multiple times without proper testing
-
generating bad science to cover up the role of its vaccines and
therapeutics in illnesses such
as Gulf War Syndrome.
Offering
DOD a place at the vaccine safety table can only result in confounding
the assessment of safety for civilian, as well as military, vaccines.
11. "DOD personnel have used DMSS (Defense Medical Surveillance
System) to conduct valuable analyses in response to concerns about
health effects that might be associated with
vaccination with AVA...
"DOD should actively support and advance the development of DMSS data
resources and staffing of units that will allow the continuing rapid and
careful analysis of these data, including but not limited to the
proposed collaboration between CDC and the Army Medical Surveillance
Activity."
The DMSS database could have been a wonderful resource for studying an
enormous variety of medical issues in active duty men and women. It
collects diagnostic data from every outpatient visit and hospitalization
of each service member within military treatment facilities. It does
not capture data from the VA or non-military medical centers.
However, serious problems exist with DMSS, at least insofar as anthrax
vaccine is concerned.
When three million person-years of non-anthrax-vaccinated service
members were compared with 500,000 person-years of vaccinated service
members, the results were unreal. It turned out that if you had
received any vaccine doses, you were only about 60% as likely to report
a huge variety of medical problems than if you were never vaccinated.
These results were highly statistically significant.
Since not even DOD can come up with a plausible explanation for these
results, which imply that anthrax vaccine is the greatest health
enhancer known to man, the results are due to either:
a) flawed statistical methodology
b) medical providers fears of documenting illnesses in recipients of
this safe vaccine, the centerpiece of military medicines biological
warfare defense, or
c) vaccine recipients apprehension that symptoms ascribable to the
vaccine may lead to forced medical retirement, so they avoid seeking
help for illnesses, or seek help elsewhere.
This is the database the IOM report applauds.
On the
other hand, the DMSS database does suggest that anthrax vaccine is
associated with an increased risk of diabetes, breast cancer, asthma,
Crohns Disease, thyroid cancer and multiple sclerosis. The IOM report
acknowledged that these associations could be signals of a possible
causal relationship, especially for diabetes, Crohns Disease and
multiple sclerosis. These are all autoimmune disorders, which are the
kinds of long-term reactions to a vaccine that might be predicted, since
vaccines act as immune stimulants.
The
report recommends "additional follow-up."
12. "DOD should develop systems to enhance the capacity to monitor
the occurrence of later-onset health conditions that might be associated
with the receipt of any vaccine; the data reviewed by the committee do
not suggest the need for special efforts of this sort for AVA."
So despite the fact that data on long-term effects are very limited,
despite the concerns about the birth defect data and DMSS data on
diabetes, multiple sclerosis and Crohns Disease, despite the refusals
of further vaccine doses by many in the UK and US, and despite the five
Gulf War Syndrome studies, the report specifically recommends against
any special efforts in vaccine safety monitoring for AVA, and wants to
shut down the one committee designated to perform this. So much for the
concept of "additional follow-up."
Should we be surprised? After all, at least three past expert panels
that were formed to debate the illnesses appearing in Gulf War veterans,
including one from the Institute of Medicine, gratuitously recommended
against performing any research into the possible role of anthrax
vaccine in Gulf War illnesses.
There is
still only limited reliable information about the effects of dioxin (the
most potent toxin in Agent Orange) in humans, thirty years after the US
stopped using Agent Orange due to health concerns.
When have
you previously seen scientists recommend against further
research? Only in two cases: when an issue has been unquestionably
resolved, or when someone is trying to hide something. Unfortunately,
this report is a replay of a tawdry old tune. Esteemed expert panel
meets to resolve complex scientific question. But read the report, and
science is the one thing thats missing. Instead, its politics (and
coverup) as usual.
The book
"Science, Money and Politics: Political Triumph and Ethical Erosion" by
Daniel Greenberg recounts the history of lies and egregious behaviors by
scientists that have eroded the values underpinning science in our
society. Maybe one has to look no farther than to Greenberg to learn how
reports like this one come to be.
IOM
approval was what DOD had been waiting for, in order to restart the
mandatory vaccination program, according to the vaccine manufacturer
(March 7 NY Times, Sheryl Stolberg). With billions of dollars on the
line for military biodefense vaccines, and the need to appear to be
doing something meaningful about the bioterrorism threat, could this
report possibly have produced any other conclusion?
If the
government may be culpable for making its own soldiers sick, dont hold
your breath waiting for the government-sponsored science that will prove
it.