Report of the CDC Public Forum on Smallpox
By Dr.
Sherri Tenpenny
The CDC held the third of a
series of meetings called the Public Forum on Smallpox on June 8, 2002 in
St.Louis, Missouri. In front of asmall group of approximately 60 people, I
had the opportunity to deliver a five minute speech as the representative of
the National Vaccine Information Center (NVIC), the major grassroots
organization on vaccine awareness in America. Please read my
five minute
speech in its entirety and the NVIC's postion on the smallpox topic..
During the presentation, I also
had the opportunity to ask several very pointed questions directed toward
the CDC representatives. This is my report of the meeting.
Everyone should be aware that
the CDC will review the answers collected on its website. The deadline
for submission is JUNE 12, but keep sending your comments even after the
deadline. All of the questions and comments made at the forums are being
taped and will be reviewed by the members of the Advisory Committee on
Immunization Practices (ACIP) prior to their final recommendations June 20,
2002.
My understanding as after
participating in this meeting is that the CDC not only wants to solicit
comments, but to see how "willingly" we will accept the vaccine.
The CDC was very forthright in
presenting truthful and accurate information about smallpox and about the
anticipated problems associated with the vaccine. Surprisingly, it seemed
the CDC was advising GREAT CAUTION regarding the use of the vaccine.
Even in the event of an
outbreak, the greatest emphasis would be placed on isolation, not just on
containment (vaccination). This certainly was not what I was expecting to
hear. And unless you were an informed listener, you would have missed the
most amazing things that the CDC said about a smallpox infection.
The morning opened with Dr.
Robert Belshe, M.D, Director of the Division of Infectious Diseases and
Immunology from St. Louis University. He has been directly involved with
clinical trials involving the Dryvax® vaccine.1 He presented an overview of
the questions the CDC put forth to the community and placed on their
website. This was a very important clarification, as the formatting of these
questions is very unclear.
The program continued with Dr.
Joel Kuritsky, the CDC's director of the Preparedness and Early Smallpox
Response Activity for the National Immunization Program. He stated that one
of the reasons that the forums were being held was to clear up some
misconceptions about smallpox. "For one thing," he said, "smallpox is not
explosively contagious."
On two separate occasions,
Kuritsky said, "smallpox is NOT like measles; it is NOT a highly contagious
disease." This has been one of the cornerstone arguments for mass
vaccination propagated by both medical journals and the popular press! I
could hardly believe what I was hearing.
Was anyone else in the room
picking up on this??
Kuritsky expounded on other
smallpox misconceptions:
1. Smallpox is spread through
"droplet contamination." The likelihood of spreading the infection from
person-to-person throughout a room is minimal because "coughing and
sneezing are not part of the disease."
2. Transmission through bed
clothing contamination is extremely rare.
3. The virus is NOT spread in
food or water.
4. Contagiousness can be
"interrupted' by the use of "a properly fitted filtered respirator mask
with an NIOSH rating of N95 or better." The key here is personalized
fitting: a fitted mask will provide a very high level of protection
against biological agents.
An extremely important
revelation that Kuritsky delineated was that smallpox will not spread
rapidly through the population. The disease is "transmitted slowly and only
after prolonged, direct, face-to-face contact." He further clarified close
contact to mean "more than 7 days" and face-to-face to mean "contact that is
within 6-7 feet."
Scientific studies were
presented to accentuate this point.2 Therefore, it is the intensity and
duration of contact that spreads smallpox. Dr. Kuritsky said casual contact
will not spread smallpox. "The scenario in which a terrorist infects himself
and walks through a city spreading the disease just wouldn't happen, even in
population-dense areas.
In the 1970s, we were able to
control the spread of the infection even in highly dense settings such as
India and Bangladesh," he explained.
Kuritsky's information comes in
part from a recent paper published by Meltzer. After analyzing data obtained
from an outbreak that occurred in 1898, Meltzer's group concluded that
"smallpox was not readily spread among the general population by brief,
casual encounters, such as walking down the street beside an ill person or
briefly being in the same shop or business.
Rather, smallpox was primarily
spread among persons living in the same house as a smallpox patient. 3
Meltzer's paper goes on to
state that, "most outbreaks have an average transmission rate of less than 1
person infected per infectious person."4 This means that less than one
person contracted smallpox from a primarily infected person! The
oft-repeated story that "millions could die from the rapid spread of
smallpox after an exposure" appears to be nothing more than theoretical
hype. (I strongly encourage everyone to read this paper.)
It is critically important to
understand that people are only contagious after the smallpox pustules have
erupted on the skin. There is no "carrier state" for this disease, as seen
with chickenpox, in which the person is contagious for several days before
the vesicular rash occurs.
The incubation period after an
acute exposure to smallpox can range from 2-17 days. The onset of a fever is
a warning sign, indicating that the person may have contracted the
infection. This is referred to as the "prodromal stage." At that point, the
person feels very ill and will most likely go to bed. "The person is sick
and will not be walking around," said Kuritsky.
The value of surveillance
post-exposure lies in the fact that a person's temperature can be monitored
daily and he can be quarantined at the
onset of fever , preferably in his own home. However it is
critically important to understand
that, even at this stage, the person is
not contagious!!
It is only after the appearance
of the smallpox rash, generally 2 to 4
days after the onset of the fever, that the person becomes
infectious. Keep in mind that there are other causes for fever: the person
may just have the flu!!
The smallpox rash has a
distinctive appearance and feel. The distribution is primarily on the face,
palms and soles, with very little seen on the trunk. In addition, unlike
chickenpox, all of the pustules have a consistent appearance throughout the
body. When palpated, the rash feels "shoddy," or like buckshot under the
surface of the skin.
However, there are other rashes
that can potentially be "confused" with smallpox. Dr. Kuritsky gave a list
of infectious diseases that present with rashes that can potentially be
misinterpreted as smallpox:
1. Chickenpox
2. Disseminated herpes simplex
3. Disseminated herpes zoster (shingles)
4. Hand-foot-mouth disease
5. Secondary syphilis
6. Molluscum contagiousum (a viral infection)
7. Erythema multiforme
In addition to viruses,
reactions to medications can occasionally precipitate a rash that could be
mistaken for smallpox. The CDC has established a "rash algorithm" to assist
healthcare professionals in differentiating smallpox from other skin
conditions. This can be viewed by going to
http://www.cdc.gov/nip/smallpox/poster-protocol.pdf.
In addition, the CDC has set up
a 24 hour "Rash Hotline" at 770-488-7100. With all these helpful aides to
assist practitioners in making the correct diagnosis, it is doubtful that
one of these rashes could be confused with smallpox, precipitating the mass
havoc as seen on the recent "ER" episode.
Prior to 1967, the World Health
Organization stated that a global vaccination rate of greater than 80% was
needed to eradicate smallpox. However, even when this rate was attained,
outbreaks still occurred in Asia and India.5 Therefore, a new strategy was
introduced in 1973. Smallpox cases were actively searched for and isolated.
Vaccination of only the
person's immediate close contacts created a barrier "ring" to decrease the
spread of the infection. Within two years after the implementation of
surveillance and containment approach, the number of smallpox outbreaks had
dramatically declined.6 This is the basis for the current CDC
recommendations of "surveillance and containment" in the event of an attack.
It is crucial to realize that
even in the event of a confirmed case of smallpox, there is no need to
panic. The CDC's position paper on smallpox, "Vaccinia (Smallpox) Vaccine
Recommendations" published June, 2001[7] states that vaccination of close
personal contacts within 4 days of the onset of the rash will be protective.
However, Dr. Kuritsky stated
that "vaccination 12-13 days out will still be protective." Based on this
information, it appears that any rush to vaccinate first responders and
medical personnel is not based on current understanding of the disease and
appears to be inappropriate.
Dr. Harold Margolis, CDC senior
advisor for smallpox preparedness, was the next to speak. The majority of
his presentation focused on the potential side effects and complications of
the vaccinia vaccine. As a former pediatrician who was still in practice
when the smallpox vaccine was still given routinely, he had seen many of
these reactions first hand. Dozens of impressive pictures were shown
demonstrating the types of reactions that could occur.
In fact, many more dreadful
pictures were shown of smallpox vaccine reactions than of smallpox itself!
It is an unfortunate fact that
a large percentage of the population is in much poorer health today than
when smallpox vaccine was "routinely" given prior to 1971 and this
exponentially increases the risk of vaccination complications.
Now more than 25% of our
population is immunosuppressed by diseases or drugs. This includes more than
28 million people with eczema[8] and millions more with a past history of
eczema; 184,000 organ recipients,[9] 850,000 individuals with diagnosed and
undiagnosed HIV infection or AIDS,[10] and 8.5 million people with
cancer.[11] Dr. Margolis presented a slide that contained these facts.
What he failed to discuss,
however, were risks involving the untold millions who are taking
immunosuppressive drugs such as the corticosteroids Prednisone® and Medrol®.
These medications are given to
both adults and children, and are prescribed for dozens of conditions
including but not limited to: asthma; emphysema; allergies; Crohn's disease;
multiple sclerosis; herniated spinal discs; acute muscular pain syndromes;
and all types rheumatoid and autoimmune diseases. All of these patients
would be at risk for serious complications -- including death -- not only
from the vaccine, but also from coming in contact with a vaccinated
individual.
Dr. Margolis provided the following information regarding the current and
projected supply of the vaccine stock:
|
Name of
vaccine |
Manufacturer |
Made from |
Number of
doses |
|
Dryvax
(1982) |
Wyeth |
Calf lymph |
15-75
million |
|
Accum 1000
(new) |
Acambis |
MRC-5 cells
(human fetal tissue) |
54 million |
|
Accum 2000
(new) |
Acambis |
Vero cells
(monkey tissue) |
155 million |
|
"frozen
vaccine" (1980s) |
Aventis |
(Unsure) |
70-90
million |
He reaffirmed that vaccinia is
NOT cowpox; it is a completely separate virus. In addition, he remarked in
passing that the vaccinia vaccine is considered an IND, or investigational
new drug. This designation should not be taken lightly. The old versions of
the vaccine-the Aventis vaccine and Dryvax® -- will be re-released. These
vaccines were never subjected to controlled clinical trials. The new Acambis
vaccines will not have to be subjected to rigorous safety standards in human
trials.
The new FDA rulings on the
development of drugs and vaccines related to bioterrorism will lower safety
production standards to fast-track production. And as always, vaccine
manufacturers as well as physicians will be protected from liability for any
vaccine-induced injuries or deaths that will undoubtedly occur. These facts
must be taken into consideration before deciding to receive the vaccine.
There was a "wrap up" of the morning, and then the floor was opened to
questions from the audience. I asked the following questions:
Q: If a person was vaccinated
with the smallpox vaccine, can they be tested to see if they still have
protective antibody levels?
A: There is no commercially
available test available to the general public.
Editorial Comment:
Some studies suggest that antibody levels from previous vaccination may
last as long as 50 years. Since this is a test that can be performed at
research laboratories, the CDC should make this type of testing
available before the vaccinia vaccine is used.
Q: (asked by another person):
Is it essential for a scar to form to know that a person has developed
immunity?
A. (Belshe) There is a high
relationship between the development of an antibody response and the
development of the scar. "The scar is a simple indication that the vaccine
is working."
Q: The CDC has published a
260 page document called "Interim Smallpox Response Plan & Guidelines." Is
this plan intended to be a "prototype" in the event that other types of
biological weapons are released on the general public?
A: (Kurtisky): Parts of it
could be used for that purpose.
Q: In the event of a confirmed outbreak, would those people considered to
be "close contacts" and in the "immediate ring" be required to be
vaccinated, even if they had a medical contraindication?
A: We would have to do the
best that we could to not vaccinate them, but they are also the ones at
greatest risk for the most serious complications from smallpox.
Editorial Comment:
There was no direct answer to this, even when several others in the
audience asked this question in various formats, including "what is the
CDC's definition of voluntary?" The question was diverted and vaguely
addressed.
Q: We read in every medical
and general publication that the case fatality rate of smallpox is 30%.
What was the actual cause of death from smallpox?
A: (by Dr. Margolis): Most
people died from electrolyte imbalances and possibly renal (kidney)
disease. In addition, the skin sometimes exfoliated (sloughed off) and it
acted like a burn. In addition, most cases that died were in Bangladesh
and Central Africa.
Q: So, what you are saying by
your answer is that those conditions are treatable and that most cases
that died took place in countries where they did not have advanced medical
care
and since the last case of known smallpox in the U.S. was in Texas in
1949, we have the medical capability to treat complications of smallpox
today
A: Some "imported cases"
people died in Europe too.
Editorial Comment:
Both doctors demonstrated an interesting "body language" response when I
asked this question. They both shifted abruptly back into their chairs,
looked at each other. I read Margolis lips, as he asked Kuritsky, "do
you want to answer this?" Kuritsky shook his head "no."
I have never seen either of
these complications listed in association with smallpox, let alone the
cause of death of smallpox! In addition, this means that people die from
potentially treatable COMPLICATIONS of this infection, not from the
infection itself!
This is a critical
distinction. The reason that most people say that they would accept the
smallpox vaccine is because of its reported 30% death rate.
In addition, this reported 30%
death rate is a statistic based on old data. It is doubtful that the death
rate would be any where near that high today. However, the severe
complication and death rate from the
vaccine might well be at least that high due to the vast number
of immunosuppressed people in our country as I mentioned earlier.
In light of all this
information, it was disheartening and alarming to hear the prepared answers
read by the organizations in attendance. Each person that commented was
required to state their name and the organization that they represented when
they read their prepared 5 minute statement. The overwhelming response by
the organizations, with the exception of my comments, can be summarized as
follows:
1. Do not start vaccinating
the general public at this time.
2. Begin vaccination of first
responders now, but on a limited basis only.
3. In the case of an
outbreak, all bets are off but vaccination should be used withresponders
and quite possibly with large sectors of the general public.
Was anyone listening? It
appears that the "public" is willing to ignore the facts that the CDC
presented and go further than was really warranted.
What is the "real agenda" of
the CDC? Why were these meetings held, given the fact that the CDC has never
been interested in what the public has to say about their policies? Over the
next few weeks and months, the rest of the story will undoubtedly unfold.
What You Can Do
I want to personally thank all
of you who called and who emailed me with letters of support and concern
after reading my press releases on Mercola.com and Rense.com or hearing me
on the radio with Joyce Riley or with Bill Boshears. Your kind words and
thoughts were very much appreciated and I will continue to do my very best
to keep you updated and informed as the possibility of mandatory smallpox
vaccination draws near.
While the possibility of
mandatory vaccination is the "bad news", the good news is that most of the
letters I received asked, "What can I do to help?" In fact this is not just
good news, it is great news, as time is short and we need America to wake up
and do it fast! To protect ourselves from those who would "protect" us by
denying us our most basic rights, we will need to be aware and willing to
act. Everyone one of us -- and everyone one of our friends and family
members MUST become aware of the critical juncture at which we now stand and
get involved.
In spite of the fact that, by
the CDC's own admission, mass vaccination is not necessarily the answer, the
Patriot Act and The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act have laid the
groundwork for it. (To view the full text of these documents, go to
www.libertyandfreedom.com.) Thinking "this could never happen here!"
will not protect you. The only chance that we have to protect our
disappearing rights is to GET INVOLVED.
Here are my recommendations:
A. Go to the CDC website and
www.cdc.gov and answer the
questions. Time is of the essence, as they are only accepting comments
until JUNE 12, 2002. To answer the questions, a clarification is
necessary. The questions are wordy and can be confusing. In simple terms,
this is what the CDC is asking:
Question #1: The CDC's
current policy for smallpox vaccination is to only vaccinate laboratory
workers. Should this be changed? Should the vaccine be available to the
general public?
Answers:
1. No change in policy; Not
recommended for the general public
2. CDC does not recommend
the vaccine but it would be available on request to the general public
3. CDC is neutral on
recommendation, but vaccine would be available on request
4. The vaccine would be
available to the general public
Question #2: Should specific
groups of first responders (ex: EMT/paramedics; police; fireman; ER
doctors and nurses; etc.) be vaccinated now?
1. No. Vaccine should be
only for laboratory personnel
2. Yes, but limited only to
smallpox response teams created by the CDC or the States.
3. Yes. Widespread
vaccination of all medical and non-medical first responders and their
support staff.
Question #3: In the even of a
confirmed outbreak, how should the vaccine be used?
1. Surveillance and
containment: Use ring vaccination only on limited basis of direct
personal contacts
2. Surveillance and
containment PLUS selected medical and 1st responders
3. Surveillance and
containment PLUS the general public in the affected communities
4. Surveillance and
containment PLUS mass vaccination of the general public.
Now that you can understand the
questions that they are asking, you can give a response that most represents
your understanding of the situation and how you feel best meets your needs
and those of your family. This is how I responded:
Question #1
.Answer #1
Question #2
.Answer #1
Question #3
.Answer #1 PLUS
the following comments:
a. The CDC data shows that
this is NOT a highly contagious virus
b. The CDC data shows that
the virus has a slow transmission rate
c. Even those at highest
risk will only contract smallpox if they have had intense contact for
more than 7 days
d. The general public must
be advised to NOT go to the hospital as the transmission rate to others
is highest within the confines of a building.12
e. It is the job of the CDC
and the Public Health Officials to ensure that the general public fully
understands this information and DOES NOT PANIC. Smallpox is not only
slow to spread, it is slow to cause severe illness.
B. Focus on education.
The real war has become an information
war; it is being fought now! Inform your state and federal
(congressional) leaders of your position. Let them know the level to which
you will resist, if that is what you are planning to do. Inform and educate
political leaders, City Counsel members, school board members, local
charities and your police and fire departments.
Have a family and neighborhood
meeting. Know in advance what your response is going to be. Most
importantly, share this information with everyone that you know.
C. Increase your stores
of food and bottled water in case a quarantine situation arises. Purchase a
filtered mask for each person in your family that is NIOSH approved with an
N95+ rating. Most importantly, have the mask appropriately fitted for each
person and keep it in an accessible place.
D. Grow and/or purchase
organic produce for your family. Seek alternative types of healthcare to
improve your immune system and maintain or restore your health. Create your
own stock of vitamins, herbs, homeopathics. Avoid prescription medications
as much as possible.
E. Keep your immune
system healthy! Avoid white (refined) sugar, white flour and white rice. Now
is the time to determine your "bowel tolerance" for Vitamin C. The best way
to do this is with powdered Vitamin C. Start with 10,000mg and increase by
5,000 mg/day until you reach a level that causes diarrhea. That level is
your bowel tolerance.
If you have an acute infection,
START AT THIS LEVEL and continue to increase to your next level of bowel
tolerance. It is a well-known and established medical fact that Vitamin C is
a potent anti-viral vitamin. Keep large stocks of this on hand in the event
of any type of bioterrorism attack.
F. Become familiar with
the use of Essential Oils, homeopathy, and other herbal remedies that have
been shown to be effective against viral infections.
"Nightfall
does not come at once, neither does oppression. In both instances, there
is a twilight where everything remains seemingly unchanged. And it is in
such twilight that we all must be aware of change in the air
however
slight
lest we become unwitting victims of the darkness."
-
Justice William O. Douglas
Dr.
Tenpenny contact information:
c/o New
Medical Awareness Seminars
Phone: (440) 268-0897
Web: www.NMASeminars.com
(coming soon)
E-mail: [email protected]
1. Frey,
Sharon E. et al. Dose Related Effects of Smallpox Vaccine. NEJM Vol. 346;
No. 17. 1275-1280. April 25, 2002.
2. Am.
Journal Epidemiology. 1971; 91:316-326.
3. Meltzer,
Martin I. et.al. Modeling Potential Responses to Smallpox as a
Bioterrorist Weapon Appendix I: A Mathematical Review of the Transmission
of Smallpox. Emerging Infectious Diseases. Vol.7, No.6. November-December,
2001.
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID /vol7no6/pdf/meltzer_appendix1.pdf
4.Meltzer.
Ibid. November-December, 2001.
5. Rao AR.
Smallpox. Bombay: The Kothari Book Depot, 1972.
6. WHO
Bulletin 1975 52:209-222.
7. ACIP
recommendations on Smallpox:
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr// preview/mmwrhtml/rr5010a1.htm
8. Diepgen
TL. Is the prevalence of atopic dermatitis increasing? In: Williams HC,
ed. Atopic Dermatitis: The Epidemiology, Causes and Prevention of Atopic
Eczema. New York: Cambridge Univ Pr; 2000:96-112.
9. United
Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS). All Recipients: Age at Time of
Transplant. www.unos.org
10. Joint
United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS. Epidemiological Fact Sheets on HIV
and Sexually Transmitted Infections: United States.
http://www.unaids.org/fact_sheets/index.html
11.
National Cancer Institute. CanQues.
http://srab.cancer.gov /Prevalence/canques.html
12. J.
Infectious Diseases. 1972: 125:161-169.
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