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UNITED WAY/COMBINED FEDERAL CAMPAIGN
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"Protecting the health and informed consent rights of children since 1982."
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www.washingtonpost.com
How to Prepare for Smallpox
By Ruth J. Katz
Saturday, June 1, 2002; Page A19
The popular television program "ER" ended its season with a cliffhanger: a
quarantine imposed after two desperately ill children were brought to the
emergency room with an infectious disease eerily reminiscent of smallpox.
Life sometimes parallels art, and federal public health experts are right now
considering how best to prepare the nation for just such a scenario. This is
strictly emergency planning: The risk of a deliberate release of smallpox is
considered low, and top health officials in the Bush administration have
explicitly said that this has not changed since Sept. 11.
Questions about who should receive the smallpox vaccination and when are
complex. Immunizing the entire population with the vaccine we have now is likely
to carry a high price -- thousands of serious complications and hundreds of
deaths. But vaccinating only those who would be on the front lines of an
epidemic, primarily health care workers, is hazardous too. Careful guidelines
have to be followed to prevent people who have been vaccinated from infecting
those who have not been. The "ring strategy," which calls for isolating those
who have been infected in an attack and vaccinating anyone who has been in
contact with them, has not been tested in decades.
Other factors must be weighed as well. There are no FDA-approved smallpox
vaccines; existing products are all considered "investigational" and will likely
remain so for the foreseeable future. The government has contracted for a newer
vaccine that may be safer, but it will not be ready for use for some time. More
research is needed to determine how much the current vaccine can be diluted and
still remain effective.
There is strong public demand for the vaccine but no consensus on whether
access should be given to anyone who wants it. Implementing a sound policy is
further complicated by misperceptions, with many physicians and lay people
believing that smallpox is almost always fatal (it actually kills about 30
percent of its victims) and that the vaccine is as safe as most childhood
vaccines (it may be the most dangerous one available).
The multiple dimensions of the issue, and the stakes involved, argue for
thoughtful decision-making. The advisory committees studying the smallpox
vaccine had expected to complete their expert review in the fall of this year.
Between now and then, an ambitious schedule of regional meetings had been
established so we could hear from professional medical organizations and groups
representing patient populations, health care workers, public health officials,
emergency response workers and the public. Now the Bush administration is asking
for an abbreviated process leading to recommendations by the middle of this
month.
As we expedite our work, we must be vigilant about doing it right. Whether or
not it is true, the public is likely to interpret efforts to broaden access to
the smallpox vaccine as sign of an increased threat. The federal government will
achieve the greatest compliance with its recommendations, and evoke the least
anxiety, if most people are confident that action rests on a solid foundation of
knowledge.
We need to understand the science better and to know whether state and local
governments are prepared to respond. Equally important, we need to educate the
stakeholders about all the potential risks and benefits. Unless the American
people believe that we have used an inclusive process to gather the facts and
weigh them judiciously, the credibility of the entire public health system may
be undermined.
The swine flu fiasco of the late 1970s illustrates what can go wrong. No one
doubts that President Gerald Ford acted with the greatest concern for the
citizenry. Nonetheless, his decision to try to inoculate all Americans against a
potentially lethal strain of flu in just nine months backfired in a way that
damaged public confidence. Concern about side effects forced the mass
vaccination program to be suspended soon after it began. The much-feared virus
never materialized, and the government response looked, at best, uninformed.
The official response to the recent anthrax scare was equally unimpressive.
No one seemed in charge, and no one spoke to the public authoritatively about
what was and was not known concerning the danger. The result was widespread fear
and an erosion of faith that can only weaken future capacity to address the
genuine threat of bioterrorism appropriately.
The Bush administration is now pushing hard on the smallpox vaccine, and it
may well have valid reasons for doing so. But public health, not politics or
public relations, needs to be the driver here. If the administration is only
seeking to show that it is "tough on smallpox" and prepared for anything in the
struggle against terrorism, health experts, elected officials and the American
public should protest the hijacking of a carefully formulated policymaking
process. Planning for a smallpox epidemic is not an event being staged for
television.
The eradication of smallpox worldwide ranks as one of the great triumphs of
public health. If there is a chance of its return, we need to combat it with the
same wisdom and determination used to vanquish it in the first place. But in the
absence of a clear and present danger, we can surely take the time to exercise
care and to be thoughtful.
The writer, associate dean at Yale University School of Medicine, is a member
of the National Vaccine Advisory Committee. These views are her own.
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