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July 8,
2002
THE
ANTHRAX ATTACKS
QUESTIONS
NOBODY WANTS TO ASK
By
Meryl Nass, MD
Amid
the uproar over the former Fort Detrick scientist with the spook-y
background in Rhodesia and South Africa, the glaring holes and
inconsistencies in the anthrax investigation have been forgotten…or,
perhaps, conveniently overlooked.
First,
why was our government convinced from the start that the perpetrator
is an American? Why did the White House announce this so early in the
investigation?
Although the administration might have learned the anthrax had a
domestic origin from genetic studies of the Ames strain, or the makeup
of the additive that neutralized the spores’ tendency to clump, the
White House announcement preceded such studies by months. Did the
President receive inside information, which has never been shared with
the public? If so, the details should be revealed. This will aid our
nation to accurately appraise assertions regarding the threat of
bioterrorism from foreign rogue states and terrorists.
Second,
although the additive’s components are classified, contradictory
statements by government spokespersons have claimed that:
- it
was identical to a US preparation, and
-
it was
an entirely new preparation unknown to US biodefense experts.
Which
is true?
Third,
there are only a small number of government scientists and contractors
who are known to work with anthrax. Interestingly enough, the
scientist who has been publicly investigated was not among them.
According to his resume and publications, he has never worked with
anthrax. Yet his anthrax vaccinations, provided by government
agencies, were up to date. Why?
While
the Defense Department was forced to curtail military anthrax
vaccinations due to lack of supply, this scientist was given his
yearly boosters. Did someone in the Defense Department (which owns the
entire anthrax vaccine stockpile) think he needed it badly? Who
authorized those vaccinations? Who was this scientist working for, and
what had he been doing since returning to the US from South Africa and
the UK?
Fourth,
what were the scope of his pursuits during the years his resume says
he was obtaining three masters’ degrees and a PhD, in addition to his
medical (MD) degree?
Fifth,
how many people have the knowledge and access to either obtain or
create this type of spore preparation? How many others may reside in
the "intelligence" netherworld, unknown to the rest of us, but well
versed in the ins and outs of biowarfare and biodefense? This could be
a large number of people, all of whom should be considered suspects.
Has the FBI been informed by the military services and CIA who they
all are? How many different agencies and civilian contractors might
employ such folks? (About thirteen federal agencies perform
intelligence work.)
Sixth,
the scientist under recent FBI investigation is said to have just
traveled to Uzbekistan as a State Department contractor, to
investigate a possible bioterrorism incident. If he was truly a
suspect, as the recent public search of his properties implies, why
has he continued to work on important government projects?
Seventh, there were rare anthrax hoax letters before 1999. Then
suddenly there were hundreds sent during a few months, and then the
hoaxes died down. The hoax letters seemed to increase about the time
that Congress began having hearings on the military’s anthrax vaccine
problems, and the media started reporting vaccine problems. Might the
hoax letters have been intended to retrain Americans to think of
anthrax not as a remote possibility, but as an immediate threat? Such
a viewpoint could encourage use of a questionable vaccine that was
otherwise very unpopular.
Also in
1999, the scientist under recent investigation, working at the time
for a military contractor, hired former Fort Detrick biowarfare guru,
William Patrick, to provide a detailed 27 page report on anthrax sent
by mail.
Has the
FBI studied these old hoax letters, to assess whether any were sent by
last October’s anthrax perpetrator? Has the FBI investigated the
possibility that some of the hoax letters may have originated in a
"black" Defense Department program? If so, have they tried to learn
the identities of, and been allowed access to, the people involved in
that program?
Although hoax anthrax letters that closely resembled real anthrax
letters were sent last fall, we have heard very little about them from
the FBI.
Eighth,
there were both hoax and real anthrax-containing letters found in
other countries last fall. The public has never been informed of the
results of investigations concerning those letters.
Ninth,
it was recently reported that careful genetic analysis of various
anthrax strains was unable to determine the origin of the strain used
last fall. However, none of the media reports gave any information
regarding the details of the genetic analysis that was done: the
number and location of sites on the genome where mutations exist, and
the actual results. Without that information, it is impossible to tell
if the analysis was thorough or accurate.
Tenth,
in February I suggested the likelihood that a Biosafety 3 or 4
laboratory was used to fill the anthrax envelopes last fall. There
have been no media reports of surveys of these facilities’ use during
last September and October. Has the FBI investigated this?
Eleventh, who gave the order for Iowa State University in Ames to
destroy its anthrax collection just days after the attacks were
identified? Why hasn’t FBI director Mueller publicly explained why
this was done?
Twelfth, the homes and other buildings of suspects have been searched
and sampled for anthrax spores. Media reports indicate no spores have
been found. However, it is important to specify the methodology used
for sampling and identifying spores, in order to confirm that very
sensitive methods were used. There are sampling methods that will miss
small spore concentrations: remember how the American Media News
building was "clean" apart from a computer keyboard the first time
around, but when more sensitive methods were employed, the entire
building was found to be contaminated.
Most
sensitive techniques for identifying spores rely on growth in a
culture medium. However, fumigation, ozonation and other treatments
have the ability to kill stray spores, preventing growth and avoiding
detection. Have any properties of potential suspects been treated in
this manner?
The
FBI’s curious approach to all the above implies we are not dealing
with a lone-wolf Unabomber. There would be no need for the FBI to
avoid important aspects of the investigation if it was seeking a crazy
scientist who worked alone.
The
FBI’s early dissemination of a Unabomber-like profile may have
deflected public gaze from the Army, CIA, and their contractors, away
from the possibility that more than just a lone-wolf bioterrorist
might be involved.
But the
accumulating facts in this case suggest involvement of more than one
person. The logistics of stealing, being given or producing weaponized
anthrax; receiving the training that enabled the attack to be carried
out; obtaining a safe environment to work in; receiving vaccinations;
mailing the letters from different cities; and getting away with it
for the past nine months, all suggest a group effort that may well
turn out to be connected to the US government in some manner.
Will
Congress, due to hold hearings on this subject, muster the resolve to
get to the bottom of the anthrax attacks? Will it seriously try to
learn these answers?
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