Experience elsewhere suggests it is time for the UK to
introduce a pilot scheme
In 1978 the Pearson Commission in the United Kingdom rejected a no-fault
system in dealing with clinical negligence. Whiledeclaring the
existing tort system as costly, cumbersome, proneto delay, and too
capricious in its operation to be defensible,the commission rejected
no-fault compensation on grounds of thedifficulty in overhauling the
tort liability system and the perceiveddifficulties in causation
judgments.1 A general conservatismin
the legal profession and opposition from the insurance industrywere
other factors. Much has changed in the NHS sincethen.
The long overdue white paper on the reform of the clinical negligence
compensation system is much awaited. Reforms to be consideredinclude
fixed tariffs for specific injuries, no-fault compensation,
alternative dispute resolution, structured payouts instead oflarge
one-off lump sums, and alternative non-cash methods of compensation
such as home nursing care.2 The current system is
based onthe law of tort, which requires the claimant to prove harm
causedby a breech of the duty of care. The adversarial and blame
orientatednature of this system is not conducive to the culture of
opennessrequired by clinical governance and the NHS Plan. Supporters
ofthe current system point to the threat of litigation as a
deterrentto substandard care, although the evidence does not support
this.Levels of medical litigation are five times as high in the
UnitedStates than Canada, but no evidence exists that doctors in theUnited States deliver superior care. Any deterrent role is becomingincreasingly redundant in the face of more effective risk management,clinical governance, peer review, and monitoring by hospital authoritiesand the General MedicalCouncil.
In no-fault liability the claimant must show that the medical error was a
causative factor in the resultant injury, irrespectiveof who is to
blame (proof of causation rather than proof of fault).Medical
accidents are an expected social phenomenon, and lossesare
calculated through an inquisitorial tribunal, which has accessto all
relevant documents and independent expert advice. The reductionin
legal and administrative costs and a lower level of payoutsoffset
the costs of greater numbers of claimants. The advantageis that
claims can be investigated promptly, without the restrictionof
communication typical of the adversarial process.3
The systemis deemed more equitable and efficient by the BMA and the
royalcolleges.
The royal colleges, cognisant that a no-fault system may seem to protect
offending doctors, emphasise that negligent professionalswould face
disciplinary procedures.4 The colleges advocatea twin track system similar to that in Canada, where avoidablehealthcare injuries are "designated compensable events" and subjectto no-faultliability.
The BMA regards the present system as harmful, unpredictable, and unjust for
both patients and medical staff. In the BMA modela no-fault
compensation fund would handle compensation after causationis proved
at a local level. The fund panel would work out compensation
according to predetermined criteria. Smaller claims would be settled
by individual trusts through the complaints procedure. Drug errors
would be excluded as too complicated and expensive.5
A no-faultsystem in clinical negligence care would not be unique in
theUnited Kingdomsimilar systems exist in workmen's compensationschemes and police injurycases.
In reforming the system, lessons can be learned from experience in other
countries. A Canadian task force recommended theintroduction of
limited no-fault compensation.6 Interestingly,many of the recommendations mirror the changes advocated by the
NHS Plan and the Woolf reformssuch as contingency fees, case
management, procedural measures to expedite the litigation process,
methods of alternative dispute resolution, effective quality assurance,and risk management. In the United States capping malpractice
awards and limiting contingency feeslawyers often take a thirdof the compensationhave been introduced successfully in somestates. Selective no-fault schemes are in place in Virginia and
Florida, covering birth related neurological injury and vaccine
injury. Another concept on trial in the United States is thatof
accelerated compensable events or designated compensable events.
Certain defined medical injuries are compensated without proofof
fault. The events tend to be avoidable and the system is beingused
in obstetrics.7 Some regard it as an incremental
movetowards a no-fault approach in the UnitedStates.
New Zealand is the greatest exponent of the no-fault system since it replaced
the tort system in 1972 after the report ofthe Woodhouse Commission.
89 Initial teething
problems ledto criticisms of compensation shortfalls, lack of
accountabilityof doctors, and the definition of medical misadventure
(used inplace of medical negligence). In 1992 a reformed act was
passedto address some of these criticisms and laid heavy emphasis ondisciplining doctors at fault. The administrative costs are 10%
of income, and the scheme seems to work well in the field of medical
litigation.10 However, the minimal cover provided
by the actand complete bar on the right to sue remain unique to New
Zealand.The socialist legal ideology of Scandinavia also favours a
no-faultprinciple in dealing with medical harm, relying on insurance
ratherthan litigation. Sweden created an insurance system for
patientsin 1975, based on voluntary agreement, and Norway introduced
asimilar scheme in 1988. Denmark adopted a mandatory patients'insurance scheme similar toFinland.
In France medical negligence claims against the state are handled under an
administrative law scheme, separate from the civiljustice system and
compensation for hospital mistakes isautomatic.
In the United Kingdom a no-fault system would increase compliance with the
mandatory reporting of adverse clinical eventsand would facilitate
the culture of openness demanded by clinicalgovernance, the NHS
Plan, and the modern approach to look forerrors in the organisations
instead of blaming individuals. 1112 It should be introduced on a limited pilot basis and monitoredclosely for someyears.
William J Gaine, consultant orthopaedic surgeon.
Falkirk Royal Infirmary, Forth Valley Healthcare Trust, Central Scotland FK1
5QE (wgaine@yahoo.co.uk)
Report of the Royal Commission on the Civil
Liability and Compensation for Personal Injury. Chairman: Lord
Pearson. Cmnd 7054-1, 1978 (paragraph 1715).
Pritchard JRS. Liability and compensation in
health care: a report to the conference of deputy ministers of the
Federal/Provincial/ Territorial review on liability and compensation
issues in health care. , 1990.
Department of Health. An organisation with a memoryreport of an expert group on learning from adverse events
in the NHS. In: London: Stationery Office, 2001.
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