Forcing Mentally Ill on Trial to Take Drugs Is Pondered
By LINDA GREENHOUSE
ASHINGTON, March 3 An inconclusive Supreme Court argument today on whether
mentally ill criminal defendants may be medicated against their will to make
them competent for trial reflected the essential difficulty and delicacy of the
mix of law and psychiatry that the case presented.
"It doesn't fit comfortably in any setting with which we're familiar,"
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor observed as she asked a government lawyer how to
balance the competing interests in such a case.
The defendant, Dr. Charles T. Sell, is a St. Louis dentist who was indicted
in 1997 by a federal grand jury on Medicaid and insurance fraud charges. His
case has a number of complexities, including a subsequent indictment for
conspiring to murder a federal witness and an F.B.I. agent, but the Supreme
Court framed the question more narrowly when it accepted his appeal four months
ago: whether it violates the Constitution to forcibly administer antipsychotic
medication in order for the government to bring someone to trial for nonviolent
offenses.
Dr. Sell and the government shared a common starting point: that as an aspect
of the individual liberty protected by the Constitution's due process guarantee,
people do have a substantial interest in avoiding unwanted mind-altering
medication. Michael R. Dreeben, a deputy solicitor general arguing for the
government, described the individual liberty interest as substantial enough to
justify placing an extra burden on the government to justify the need for
medication.
But from there, the two arguments diverged. Mr. Dreeben said the government
had met that heightened burden, despite the nonviolent nature of the felony
charges the court was considering. The government has a "compelling interest" in
bringing criminal defendants to trial and in "maintaining social order and
peace" through resolving serious criminal charges, he said.
Mr. Dreeben said that medication had the proven ability to restore mentally
ill defendants "to a point of rationality where they can decide what they want
to do with their life." A defendant might rationally choose to go to trial
rather than face being "warehoused" in a mental health institution, he said.
Dr. Sell's court-appointed lawyer, Barry A. Short, argued that the balance
tilted clearly in favor of his client, whom he described as dangerous neither to
himself nor others and whose nearly five years of pretrial confinement was
already longer than the sentence the federal guidelines would impose had he been
tried and convicted.
Dr. Sell has a fundamental right to refuse medication, he said, adding that
"under these circumstances, I do not see any compelling interest whatsoever in
prosecuting this defendant." He said that although Dr. Sell was incompetent as a
legal matter, he was "medically competent" to understand his situation and make
his own decisions.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in St. Louis,
upheld a federal district court's decision that the government's request for
medication was justified. But although the Supreme Court had accepted Dr. Sell's
appeal, Sell v. United States, No. 02-5664, a number of justices today expressed
doubt about whether the court should actually decide the case.
Since the lower courts addressed the question of whether someone may be
medicated in order to stand trial, their decisions were, by definition, pretrial
orders. Under the ordinary rules of appellate procedure, pretrial orders lack
finality and are not appealable unless they come within a few recognized
exceptions.
So shouldn't Dr. Sell be required to proceed to trial and to challenge any
unwanted medication after the fact or in a civil lawsuit, Justice Antonin Scalia
wanted to know. "I'm concerned that a new exception could disrupt criminal
trials substantially," Justice Scalia said, asking what would happen if a
medicated defendant decided in the middle of a trial that he wanted the
medication to stop. "I see all kinds of problems with immediate appeals," he
said.
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor also appeared
doubtful of the court's jurisdiction to proceed with the case.
The last-minute emergence of the jurisdictional issue was surprising, given
that neither side had identified it as a problem. The justices had issued an
order last Friday afternoon instructing both lawyers to be prepared to discuss
whether the court has jurisdiction, and directing them to file briefs on the
issue this Friday.
If the court finds itself unable to decide this case, it may soon have an
even more highly charged case to consider. The Eighth Circuit decided another
involuntary medication case last month, ruling 6 to 5 that a mentally ill death
row inmate can be forcibly medicated in order to be made competent to be
executed.
The issue of forcible medication is highly controversial and has split the
mental health professions. In the case today, the American Psychological
Association filed a brief on behalf of Dr. Sell. It warned that the same drugs
that restore a defendant to competency "can prejudice the defendant in the eyes
of the jury" by creating the appearance of boredom or restlessness.
The American Psychiatric Association filed a brief for the government,
arguing that medications that restore a defendant to competency are often the
most medically appropriate way of treating the mental illness. "The court should
not ignore the real costs of leaving a defendant untreated," the psychiatrists
said.
In addition to due process and fair trial rights, Dr. Sell's supporters also
raise objections under the First Amendment to involuntary mind-altering
medication. A brief submitted by the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers tells the court that if Dr. Sell testified under the influence of
medication, "his words would not be his own" but would be the government's.
Dr. Sell's diagnosis is "delusional disorder, persecutory type." Essentially,
he believes that the F.B.I. is conspiring against him. He is being held in the
federal prison system's medical center in Springfield, Mo.
The justice most sympathetic to his position today was Anthony M. Kennedy. "I
don't understand the government's basic authority to do this at all," Justice
Kennedy said to Mr. Dreeben, the government's lawyer.
Justice Stephen G. Breyer, on the other hand, appeared skeptical of Dr.
Sell's argument. "There are a lot of seriously ill people whom these drugs help
a lot," he told Mr. Short, Dr. Sell's lawyer.
The court seemed to find the case almost exasperatingly difficult. "What is
your solution to this dilemma?" Justice Scalia asked Mr. Short. "We can't try
him because his mind is not working properly, but you say he's entitled to
refuse the drugs that would make his mind work properly. It's just a crazy
situation. What can we do about it?"
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