From bioscience to bioterror: Are we too late?
9 January 2003 17:00 GMT
by Henry Nicholls
Plans
by the US government to prevent sensitive biological information
falling into the hands of would-be terrorists could be a case of
too little too late, warns a British toxin expert. The recent
explosion in life-science research and the openness that has
traditionally accompanied it have raised concerns that sensitive
information is falling into the wrong hands, but those concerns
should have been raised years ago, says Mike Lord, head of the
University of Warwick's Toxin Research Group.
"Any potentially useful information has been in the public
domain for considerable time and will have been accessed by
potential terrorists long since," Lord told BioMedNet News.
Lord's research focuses on the mode of action of ricin, the
lethal toxin that put UK authorities on alert this week following
its discovery at a London home. "I do not think that our published
research on ricin ... will have added significantly to the general
information already available to potential terrorists," he said.
His views coincide with a meeting held today in Washington D.C.
that brought together researchers, security agents, and
policy-makers to discuss how current publication policies and
practices might be altered to prevent the inadvertent disclosure
of "sensitive" information to potential bioterrorists.
"The US is right to take the bioterrorism threat seriously,"
said Lord, "[but] at this stage, I do not believe that current
publication practices are compromising national security." The
information is already out there.
Speakers in Washington urged scientists to exert "voluntary
restraint" over the details of their research that they publish.
"The scientific community must act responsibly to develop
self-policing procedures that permit the advancement of science
needed for the protection of public health," said Ronald Atlas,
president of the American Society for Microbiology.
Similar concerns about the responsibilities of scientists and
publishers were raised last year, when it was reported in
Science that active, infective polio virus could be produced
from an artificially synthesized polio genome.
Bioterrorism presents a new and different threat from chemical
terrorism that we are only just beginning to appreciate, says
David Franz, a military medical scientist at the Southern Research
Institute. Biological agents have a potentially enormous impact
that is very difficult to attribute. "It could be some ricin in
your sandwich or it could be a pandemic of smallpox," he said.
The need to get to grips with the ethical responsibility of the
bioscience community was echoed at the workshop by John H.
Marburger, III, director of the White House Office of Science and
Technology Policy, who explained that current publication
policies, and the mechanisms used to implement them, such as peer
review, focus on screening manuscripts for scientific rigor and
relevance, but not on screening for sensitive information that
could be mis-used.
"There is much in the biomedical literature that would assist
anyone wishing to make bioweapons," he told BioMedNet News.
"The Administration is working with the scientific community and
the homeland security community on how the current lack of
policies should be addressed," he said.
However, many agree with Lord that some biological threats,
such as this week's discovery of quantities of ricin, have little
to do with current publication practices in the biological
sciences. "If you can cook and follow a recipe, you can make ricin,"
said Stephen S. Morse, director of the Center for Public Health
Preparedness at Columbia University.
Nevertheless, the National Academy of Sciences and the Center
for Strategic and International Studies will co-host additional
meetings this year to examine issues related to preserving
scientific openness and strengthening national security in the new
age of terrorism.
"In a time of heightened threats against America, we must
ensure not only that new security requirements do not undermine
science - an enterprise vital to national security - but also that
advances in science do not unintentionally undermine the enhanced
security we seek," said John J. Hamre, president and chief
executive officer of the Center for Strategic and International
Studies. "If we do not start now with a constructive dialog, it's
going to be a nightmare," he told delegates.